Ukraine’s Fight Against Corruption Amid War and EU Integration
- Young Diplomats Society
- 2 days ago
- 6 min read
By Olesia Hramiak
We Will Change or Die
This phrase echoed through the recent anti-corruption protests in Ukraine. Despite the ongoing Russian invasion and restrictions on mass gatherings, Ukrainians took to the streets to demand the repeal of Bill No. 12414 — a controversial law that threatened the independence and effectiveness of the country’s anti-corruption institutions.
Corruption remains the second biggest problem for Ukraine after Russian aggression. A recent survey shows 91.4% of the population and 83.1% of businesses believe it is widespread. Its elimination is both a domestic demand and a precondition for Western aid and funding. Yet foreign statements — such as US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene’s to “stop funding and sending weapons”— do little to address the core problem.
The analysis of corruption in Ukraine shows that oversight by civil society and European partners is essential to keeping government efforts on the right track. This article examines the origins and development of corruption in Ukraine, the measures taken by the government and civil society, and Ukraine’s position in the broader European context.
Historical Overview
Large parts of present-day Ukraine were incorporated into the Russian Empire over the 118th and 19th centuries. From 1922 to 1991, Ukraine was a constituent republic of the Soviet Union — a state in which both avenues for corruption identified by James Scott were present: structural factors that created opportunities for unlawful gifts, and cultural values that normalised such exchanges.
Historian James Heinzen, in The Art of the Bribe, explains that the collectivisation of agriculture expanded black markets. War and postwar instability deepened underground activity, while mass arrests for petty economic crimes created opportunities for under-the-table payments and “gifts of gratitude” in exchange for leniency.
Examples were common:
In the Ukrainian SSR, officials accepted illicit payments for registering births, marriages, and deaths.
An Odessa newspaper described how wounded veterans were forced to make “gifts” to secure housing.
On August 1, 1946, Pravda reported that a Kherson railway cashier was jailed for eight years for selling 71 tickets at inflated prices.
The first Soviet anti-corruption law, on bribery (May 8, 1918), punished all parties to a bribe with up to five years of hard labour.
In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine declared its independence. As a newly sovereign state, it had to establish its own laws, institutions, and regulations across every sphere of life. However, Russian influence remained significant through government officials, economic partnerships, cultural ties, infiltration by spies, and entrenched practices such as corruption.
The 2014 Revolution of Dignity: A Turning Point
These entrenched practices intensified public frustration. After decades of injustice and corruption, Ukrainians reached a breaking point in 2014 during the Revolution of Dignity. This series of mass protests began after Ukraine’s pro-Russian president refused to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. The protests led to his ousting, accelerated anti-corruption reforms, and spurred the creation of key institutions, including:
National Agency of Corruption Prevention (NACP) — develops policy and prevention measures.
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) — investigates high-level corruption cases.
Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) — oversees NABU investigations and represents the state in court.
The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) of Ukraine tries major corruption cases, with damages as of December 1, 2019, exceeding 1,051,000 UAH (approximately 43,900 USD).
National Agency of Ukraine for Finding, Tracing, and Management of Assets (ARMA) — traces and manages confiscated assets.
Appointments are made through open competitions, involving international experts to ensure integrity. Since 2023, investigations have targeted figures such as ex-presidential office adviser Artem Shylo; ex-Agriculture Minister Mykola Solskyi; the former Supreme Court head Vsevolod Kniazev, and many others.
Bill No. 12414: Crisis and Protest
Yet, despite these institutional advances, progress has not been linear. On July 22, 2025, Bill 12414 was adopted, threatening to roll back the reforms. This bill would strip the Head of SAPO of autonomy and oversight of NABU investigations. It would grant the Prosecutor General access to all NABU cases and the power to reassign them to other bodies. A “single window” would be created to close cases involving top officials, as decided by the Prosecutor General, whom the President appoints.
As the BBC reported, hundreds of people protested in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and other cities. Former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called it “a bad day for Ukraine.” European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, warned the bill was “ a serious step back,” stressing that these bodies were "essential" for Ukraine's EU path. Russia’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov tried to exploit the situation, claiming that “a significant share of the financial assistance provided to Ukraine was stolen.”
Following street protests, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law restoring the independence of anti-corruption bodies. The EU and protesters welcomed it, but stressed that further work remains.
EU Membership
Bill 12414 is more than a legislative setback—it reflects broader trends in Ukraine’s EU path. Since the 1990s, Ukraine has aspired to join the Union but formally applied for membership only on February 28, 2022 — five days after Russia’s full-scale invasion. Delays were driven by a lack of political will, shifting presidential administrations, lengthy procedures, disagreements among EU member states, and the extensive reforms required for accession. Joining the EU also demands stable institutions and a well-functioning anti-corruption infrastructure.
Corruption remains a sensitive issue and is often cited as an argument against Ukraine’s accession. Yet the country has shown steady progress, with current indicators comparable to other candidate states — and even some EU members at the time of their accession. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), illustrates this trend.
Over the past decade, Ukraine’s CPI rose from 25 to 35 in 2024 — placing it 105th out of 180 countries. By comparison, Moldova gained 1 point and ranked 76th; Serbia lost 1 point and ranked 105th; and Turkey remained at 107th. Some previous EU entrants also faced high CPI scores before joining the Union. For example, Poland joined in 2004 with a CPI of 3.6/10 in 2003, and Romania in 2007 with a CPI of 3.1/10 in 2006 (on the old 0–10 scale, where 0 = highly corrupt and 10 = very clean).
While CPI highlights that Ukraine is not alone in its struggle, the country's experiences differ. In Poland, for instance, pro-EU campaigns educated citizens on the benefits of membership. In Ukraine, on the other hand, citizens have actively pressured the government to stay on course, as seen during the Revolution of Dignity and the response to Bill 12414.
That’s why surveys show Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as the responsibility of central authorities — the President, Parliament, and NABU. Yet, as a Ukrainian politician, Roman Grischuk noted, “ an anti-corruption organ is in every person”. Ultimately, these dynamics — EU aspirations, institutional reforms, and civil society oversight — are essential to keeping Ukraine on its anti-corruption and EU integration path.
Conclusion
These protests were not anti-government— they targeted a specific law. The protesters became known as the “people with cardboard signs” because they carried pieces of cardboard with creative slogans — one notable slogan was “Ukraine is not Russia.” The government has shown it can reverse laws when citizens demand it. The greater challenge is to extend that determination to confronting corruption at all levels.
Now, Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration into the EU is planned simultaneously. The main task is to fulfil the Union’s requirements because, as history shows, development can be a cure against corruption.
Olesia is a final-year International Relations student at Civitas University in Warsaw, Poland. As a Ukrainian, she brings valuable insight into her country’s domestic context and a comparative perspective shaped by direct engagement with recent protest participants. Her academic interests include diplomacy, foreign policy, and European studies. She is currently interning at the Bureau of European Integration in Lviv—the first municipal office in Ukraine dedicated to promoting EU integration at the local level. Alongside her studies, she pursues academic and civic initiatives and volunteers at Ukraiński Dom (Ukrainian House), a foundation that fosters Ukrainian-Polish ties. These experiences inform her research and provide the foundation for this article on Ukraine’s fight against corruption amid war and its path toward EU membership.
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