Syria’s Alawites After the Fall of Assad

By Ali Mahmoud

Source: Wikipedia

When Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of the Islamist rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), declared victory in Syria, the Alawite community were faced with a historic and existential question: integration or isolation?

The Alawites are a mystic, ethno-religious group and an offshoot of Shia Islam, comprising about 15 percent of Syria’s population. Concentrated mainly in the country’s coastal hinterland, the Alawites have historically sought protection through political dominance. Under the Assad dynasty, which has ruled Syria since 1970 with an iron fist, the Alawites became the backbone of the regime’s power, forming the bulk of the Syrian Army and intelligence services. When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, Alawites further mobilised auxiliary militias to defend the Assad regime against opposition forces.

Fast forward to 2024: after a rapid rebel offensive led by HTS, Bashar al-Assad fled the country. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham—the now dominant force within the current Syrian interim government—is an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Its ideological hostility toward Shiites in general—and the more secular Alawites in particular—runs deep. It brands the Alawites not only as heretics but as political enemies, citing their central role in sustaining the Assad regime’s decades-long grip on power. 

The Alawites, now leaderless, found themselves in a precarious position. Like a deer caught in the headlights, they froze, putting down their weapons and allowing the rebels to enter the coastal region, which they quickly declared “liberated.”

In early March 2025, remnants of the Assad regime launched an insurgency across several towns in Syria’s coastal region. In retaliation, the militant-led Syrian interim government unleashed an indiscriminate military offensive on the coastal governorates of Tartus and Latakia—killing hundreds of regime loyalists and perpetrating thousands of sectarian-based killings. 

Efforts to reconstitute an Alawite leadership are underway but remain fragmented. A nascent religious authority is forming, while diaspora activists and remnants of the old regime compete to fill the void. Yet none have gained broad legitimacy or control. This internal power vacuum has left the Alawite community directionless, with little agency of its own, and increasingly reliant on external powers' backing—or manipulation.

With the Islamist interim authority tightening its grip on Syria, tensions for the Alawites are higher than ever. They must now choose between a difficult unification with broader Syria or blood-fought isolation in their coastal strongholds. Integration would require accepting minority status under a centralised, unitary state. Isolation, by contrast, envisions an autonomous enclave where the Alawites could preserve their ethno-religious identity.

Their decision will hinge on two key factors: both sides’ willingness to reconcile, and the geopolitical agendas of regional and international powers.

A Fork in the Road

Source: The New York Times

The Alawites now face a crossroads reminiscent of the 1920s, when Saleh al-Ali, an Alawite sheikh, called for unity with Syria during the French Mandate. His vision rejected the idea of an isolated Alawite state, instead embracing Syria’s broader national identity. Will today’s Alawites follow in his footsteps and reintegrate into the Syrian fold? Or will the scars of war, the tides of geopolitics, and mounting external pressures lead them to forge a new identity under a separate flag?

HTS signalled a willingness to compromise with the Alawites about a year ago. Now in power, however, its ability to prevent sectarian violence has proven limited. Nonetheless, that earlier openness offers a faint glimmer of hope for integration. Yet, the agendas of major players—Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Israel—are more likely to pull the Alawites in the opposite direction: toward isolation.

Turkey: Ankara may push for official reconciliation between the Alawites and the interim government to stabilise Syria and curb Kurdish ambitions for full independence in the northeast. Preserving Syria’s territorial integrity remains a strategic priority for Turkey.

Iran: Tehran, by contrast, has already been accused of arming Alawite militias and regime loyalists to create a loyal enclave—a foothold for Iranian influence in post-Assad Syria. Yet, given the failure of the recent insurgency, Iran’s role will likely remain constrained.

Russia: With critical naval and air bases in Tartus and Latakia, Moscow may back Alawite efforts to establish an autonomous coastal region, ensuring its strategic interests remain protected. However, this depends on whether the interim government can achieve a genuine, inclusive political order.

Israel: Having already extended its deep reach into Syrian territory, Israel may quietly favour the formation of an Alawite enclave. This could, in turn, be used to justify similar moves by the Druze community in the southeast—effectively creating a buffer zone between Israel and a potentially hostile, Islamist-led government in Damascus.

The Alawite community stands before two perilous options—each fraught with risk, yet offering a different kind of survival.

Though political mobilisation to integrate and preserve a semblance of autonomy may be tolerated, the scars of past persecution—and the fear of future retribution—would shadow any attempt at inclusion. Conversely, pursuing isolation would undoubtedly provoke retaliation from Damascus unless backed decisively by foreign powers such as Russia, Iran, or even Israel. Without external guarantees, autonomy may be a fantasy more than a feasible future.

Conclusion

The future of Syria’s Alawites remains uncertain. Their choice between unity and isolation will not only define the survival of their community but also shape the trajectory of Syria’s post-war future. With extremism on the rise and regional powers pulling in opposing directions, the Alawites’ fate hangs precariously in the balance. For now, the answer to this historic question remains unwritten.

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Ali Mahmoud is an undergraduate student at La Trobe University, majoring in Political Science and International Studies. Of Syrian background, he has a strong interest in Middle Eastern politics, as well as political theory and philosophy. Ali currently works as a public servant and enjoys creative writing and reading in his free time.