In a Realist’s World, Do Values and Interests Still Matter?

By Deborah Bouchez

Source: President of the Republic of Finland

Alexander Stubb described foreign policy as resting on three essential pillars: values, interests, and power. In an increasingly fractured international environment, where authoritarian assertiveness is on the rise and alliances are being tested, many observers have turned to realism to explain state behaviour. Realist thinkers emphasise power and survival above all. But in such a world, can values and interests still hold sway?

This article argues that they can and must. This is especially critical for middle powers like Australia, whose influence relies not on dominance, but on persuasion and diplomacy that is grounded in shared values and long-term interests. In an era of multipolarity and strategic rivalry, these principles provide the foundations for building coalitions, shaping norms, and amplifying one’s voice.

Realism and the Allure of Power

Realism is one of the most enduring theories within international relations. Thinkers like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer see the global system as anarchic, as there’s no world government to enforce rules. In this context, states are rational and self-interested, seeking power to ensure survival.

Realists argue that alliances are often transactional: forged not on shared values, but as a counter to common threats. The U.S.-led “Hub-and-Spokes” alliance system in Asia is often cited as an example where bilateral defence ties are designed to contain threats rather than create a community.

Today’s world seems to validate this view. With the intensification of the U.S.-China rivalry, the return of great power competition, and rising military spending, the assumptions of realism resonate. Countries are rearming, hedging, and hardening their positions.

Yet this lens has limits. It struggles to explain why some partnerships persist even after threats disappear, or why certain norms (like non-intervention or human rights) shape state behaviour, despite lacking enforcement. There is more to global affairs than zero-sum power games.

The Constructivist Rebuttal: Identity, Norms and the Role of Values

Constructivist theory offers a different perspective. As Alexander Wendt famously put it, “anarchy is what states make of it.” This means that a state's behaviour depends not only on material power, but also on shared ideas, norms, and identities.

This lens helps explain the durability of alliances like NATO, which is not just a military bloc, but a “community of democracies” that upholds liberal values. Shared identities, such as democratic governance or respect for human rights, can generate trust and predictability in international relations.

For middle powers, values-based diplomacy is a strategic asset. Countries that promote human rights, climate action, or the rule of law may earn legitimacy and soft power, thereby enhancing their global influence without requiring overwhelming force.

Narrative matters too. States that are seen as credible, principled, and trustworthy are more likely to lead in multilateral settings or shape regional norms. For Australia, investing in values is not charity; it’s influence-building. Yet, as critics have noted, this rhetoric must be matched by institutional support; sidelining soft power risks undermining the very legitimacy and trust that values-based diplomacy depends on.

The Value of Multilateralism for Middle Powers

Middle powers often lack the muscle to shape outcomes unilaterally, but multilateral institutions can amplify their voice. Forums such as the United Nations, ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum, and even informal groupings like the Quad, provide platforms to promote shared values and interests.

Australia has long invested in these institutions, not just as a norm-abiding actor, but as a regional partner with a vested interest in stability and development. In the Pacific, Canberra’s emphasis on democratic norms, climate cooperation, and development assistance is central to its foreign policy narrative. While Australia remains the region’s largest aid donor, critics argue that this narrative has often been undermined by inconsistent engagement and a perception of paternalism. This highlights the need for values-based diplomacy to be backed by genuine partnerships and long-term trust-building.

Though multilateral progress can be slow and frustrating, it offers an alternative to raw transactionalism. More importantly, consistent values-based engagement builds reputational capital – others take note of who shows up, who contributes, and who listens. That credibility is a form of power.

Australia: Power-Constrained but Influence-Seeking

Australia doesn’t possess great power capabilities, but it punches above its weight by aligning strategic interests with principled diplomacy. The 2023 International Development Policy, for example, reframes aid as a means of shaping regional stability and promoting shared prosperity, rather than merely providing generosity.

Initiatives like “vuvale” (family) diplomacy in the Pacific highlight respect and partnership. Australia’s role in the Quad is similarly framed around the values of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” not just strategic balancing.

Importantly, values and interests often converge. Promoting democratic governance in the Pacific serves Australia’s security interests. Building climate resilience protects long-term regional stability.

Australia’s foreign policy sits between major power alignment and independent multilateralism. While its alliance with the United States remains vital, Canberra also seeks influence through development partnerships, norm-building, and trusted relationships, all of which are tools that realism alone cannot explain.

Conclusion

Stubb’s three pillars: ‘values, interests, and power’ are not relics. For middle powers like Australia, they are essential instruments of statecraft. In an increasingly contested world, power matters, but so do legitimacy, partnerships, and narrative.

Global challenges, such as climate change, pandemics, and cyber threats, don’t respect borders. No country can confront them with force alone. As such, resilient foreign policy must be principled, pragmatic, and persuasive. That is how middle powers remain relevant and shape the world around them.

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Deborah is a Master of International Relations student at the University of Queensland, passionate about strategic policy, defense cooperation, and the shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Her academic interests lie in how middle powers like Australia navigate alliance politics, regional security, and great-power competition. With extensive cross-cultural experience living and studying abroad, she brings a global lens to questions of diplomacy, influence, and international order. Through her writing for the Young Diplomats Society, Deborah explores how policy is shaped not just by power, but by people: connecting big-picture strategy with the human stories that underpin global affairs.