Tempting Trump: Pro-Washington signalling from the Philippines and New Zealand
Rupert Azzopardi
The second Trump administration will arrive after a decade of devolving United States-China relations and emerging regional Pacific states that are concerned by China’s growing influence over them. Instead of extending overtures to these anxious states, it is widely expected that Trump will adopt more of an isolationist policy in the region. In his previous administration, Trump withdrew the US from Obama-era multilateral infrastructure such as the Paris Agreement on climate, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership designed to mitigate dependence on trade with China and reduce tariffs on their exports. Now, as Trump espouses his ‘America First’ policy, tariffs are back in play, even amongst allies. Instead of seeking to enact an institutional balancing strategy amongst other like-minded actors, the US is likely to target China on a bilateral basis. Thus, the fear of abandonment amongst pro-Washington actors is real.
This fear has prompted traditional allies of the United States to adopt a total foreign policy reorganisation around Trump’s America; in the process, shedding diplomatic ties with China. Although states such as the Philippines and New Zealand have adopted hybrid approaches to the rivalry between the two Pacific great powers in recent years, their new governments have deliberately approached the US in matters of security.
By publicly demonstrating their own willingness to commit to US military goals, these states seek to allay suspicions that their implication with the US-led order in the Indo-Pacific is a burden to the United States.
A Fearful Philippines
“America is proud of its part in the great story of the Filipino people. Together our soldiers liberated the Philippines from colonial rule. Together we rescued the islands from invasion and occupation. The names of Bataan, Corregidor, Leyte, Luzon evoke the memories of shared struggle and shared loss and shared victory.”
President George W. Bush, remarks to the Philippine Congress, October, 2003.
In November, the Philippines’ National Secretary of Defence, Gilberto Teodoro Jr., hosted his US counterpart, Lloyd Austin in Manila. There, the two committed to a military intelligence-sharing deal, deepening their mutual defence treaty signed in 1951. The two states converge on matters of joint security in the context of an enthusiastically-promoted history of defeating tyrants together: Spain, Japan and — heavily implied — now China.
This rhetoric certainly serves the United States: following the liberation of the Philippines from Spanish colonial rule, a second bout of colonisation under the US occurred. In the Filipino-American War from 1899-1902, as many as 600,000 Filipinos were killed by the American forces. Yet the American role as a ‘tyrant’ is largely overlooked in modern relations between the two states.
Instead, the Philippines leans on decades of security cooperation with the US to underpin its current maritime sovereignty dispute with China. Today, the Marcos Jr. administration steadfastly looks across the Pacific to the US for support in the South China Sea.
At an in-conversation event hosted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in November in Melbourne, Mr Teodoro reiterated the importance of regional allies converging to protect the rule of law in the South China Sea. Describing the sea as the “aorta of the Indo-Pacific”, it occupies a position of immense strategic importance to interested actors across the broader region. He invoked the responsibility of extra-regional actors such as the US, Japan, and Australia in stabilising norms of sovereignty in the sea and encouraged the evolution of the existing ‘Squad’ mini-lateral initiative into a more meaningful grouping.
Beyond the promulgation of these norms, however, Mr Teodoro’s rhetoric against China was bitterly critical. Where the previous President Duterte sought détente with China — even after Beijing rejected a sovereignty ruling of the South China Sea in favour of the Philippines — Marcos Jr.’s administration looks directly to the US for security support. A second Trump presidency was confirmed just a week before Mr Teodoro spoke in Melbourne. Teodoro’s speech indicated that the Philippines would seek to entice a potentially more isolationist Trump administration to remain committed to Indo-Pacific states with similar interests.
At the event, Mr Teodoro called the People’s Republic of China an “interloper” and blamed the rise of Sinophobic sentiment in the Philippines on China’s actions. He cited China’s grey-zone tactics, such as deploying “coast guard ships that are really battleships” against the Philippines’ maritime patrols, and claimed that espionage is taking place throughout Filipino industries by those of Chinese heritage. Earlier this year, a Filipino mayor, Alice Guo, fled the country after being accused of links to Chinese crime syndicates. In videos online, she was widely mocked for her accent and ancestry.
The controversy around the South China Sea, and the Philippines’ designation of a zone within as the ‘West Philippine Sea’, has filtered down into everyday life in the Philippines. This serves the Marcos Jr. administration’s purpose well in its bid to lean on US support to maintain its maritime sovereignty claims.
In black-and-white bids for territory, it is easy for states to paint the opposite actor as the ‘enemy’. The Philippines are demonising China’s actions in the South China Sea to draw Trump’s support in a battle over sovereignty norms.
Pacific Partners Through the Taiwan Strait
New Zealand has recently pivoted closer to the United States after nearly four decades of alienation within the ANZUS Treaty. In 1985, New Zealand refused to allow the USS Buchanan to dock, having committed to not permitting nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels in its waters. As a result, Washington downgraded diplomatic exchanges and severed military ties with Wellington. In 2021, then-New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern did not commemorate the 70th anniversary of ANZUS. Months later, the AUKUS agreement was announced without any involvement of New Zealand whatsoever.
The election of conservative Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, however, has reignited Wellington’s interest in US military aims in its neighbourhood. In September, New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins announced that in conjunction with Australia, naval vessels had sailed through the Taiwan Strait. Japanese media reported that a Japan Self Defence Force destroyer accompanied the fleet.
The Taiwan Strait is periodically the subject of ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises amongst Western and Western-allied navies. These exercises are commonly interpreted as expressions of Western support for Taiwan’s autonomy from China, while China perceives these as “provoking and threatening China’s sovereignty and security.” Choosing to partake in an exercise such as this demonstrates a decisive political stance, where previously New Zealand has practiced a more balanced and less realpolitik foreign policy.
Since the rift of the 1980s, New Zealand has engaged in less Anglo-spheric foreign policy, developing partnerships with Pacific Island states — and perhaps most importantly — China. The Treaty of Waitangi, considered a founding document of New Zealand, has produced a hybridisation of Māori and British principles in practice, creating foreign policy that does not lean as heavily on New Zealand’s legacy as a British colony. As a result, initiatives such as the ‘Pacific Reset policy’ of 2018 allowed New Zealand to adopt the “intergenerational” perspective of the Māori in relations with Pacific neighbours. This approach, when applied to an issue such as climate change, has generated a positive image for New Zealand amongst other Pacific actors.
Today, 27% of its exports are purchased by China. Fearing an over-reliance on China, Luxon has sought to balance against issues faced by other Pacific Island states such as Palau by aligning closer with the US. Like the Philippines, New Zealand policymakers may be concerned by the impact of Trump’s policy, as their winemaking industry may be impacted by the incoming US President’s tariff policy. Demonstrating cohesion alongside US security objectives to hedge against the risk of a vindictive China is integral for an anxious Prime Minister overseeing an economic recession.
This year, conservative factions in New Zealand have attempted to pass a bill reinterpreting the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, which could radically alter the way in which New Zealand considers itself an ‘independent’ actor. A New Zealand identity more closely affiliated with its British crown, rather than its Māori, heritage could dispense with a longstanding relationship-based approach to its neighbours. Furthermore, their contribution to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance has increased, resulting in the ‘freedom of navigation’ exercise and a greater contribution to an initiative preventing North Korean oil smuggling. These actions signify a desire — at least by the current government — to have a louder and more decisive voice in the great power rivalry in the Pacific.
In the past, New Zealand has been labelled the “The Phantom Eye” due to its relatively small output in this organisation. Luxon’s government has sought to demonstrate to next year’s second Trump administration that it is willing to and capable of contributing more to Western-driven security systems — at the expense of its relationship with China.
Across the Pacific, states with a history of ties to the United States are looking to build upon them for their own benefit. States are relinquishing hybrid foreign policy in favour of attracting American security interplay, as expected tariffs under Trump’s ‘America First’ economic policy could embroil them in-between conflicts amongst great powers. Fearing abandonment by a protectionist Trump administration, demonstrating pro-Washington militarism is a gamble on a president who may not commit in the same way as his predecessors and even his previous administration in the region. Furthermore, persisting with anti-Chinese sentiment amidst a potential US withdrawal could constitute a costly diplomatic faux pas.
States choosing to rattle their sabres on behalf of a detached Washington could find this action backfiring in damaging ways.
Rupert is a Master of International Relations student at the University of Melbourne, with an interest in contested and alternative forms of sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific. Before writing for Young Diplomats Society, he was published for his columns and short fiction.
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