The Practice of Authoritarian Soft Power: A comparison between China and Russia
By Layla Bautista
Russia and China are among the most controversial States in geopolitics, and their ability to project soft power is a topic that has been vigorously debated by scholars and political commentators. Although China and Russia are one party states, they have improved their ability to project soft power, primarily through positioning themselves as a counter to Western values. But due to the nature of their regimes, their ability to project soft power is inevitably constrained.
China’s emergence as a global manufacturing hub and infrastructure financier has significantly bolstered its soft power, particularly in the Global South. Further, China’s rich culture has been used through Confucius Institutes at universities to help promote Chinese culture and language to foreigners. Meanwhile, Russia’s moral conservatism and illiberal governance is a direct counter to Western liberalism, serving as a model which appeals to many and often takes advantage of Western instability to fuel its geopolitical ambitions. Finally, a further dimension of both Russian and Chinese soft power lies in their use of corruption and state capture, particularly in the Global South. International state capture is used as a form of political influence in other countries, and acts as an imperial overreach. Still, whilst both China and Russia have made significant investments in projecting soft power, their efforts are constrained by the very nature of their political systems.
China’s economic transformation in the late twentieth century provided the foundation for its expansionist geopolitical ambitions. Its manufacturing and infrastructure success generated not only material power but also a degree of international appeal. As defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1990), soft power is the ability of a state to obtain desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment, drawing on elements such as culture, values, governance, and international engagement. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has explicitly sought to cultivate this form of influence. At the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP in 2007, soft power was formally incorporated into national policy. At this congress, former President Hu Jintao declared that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture”. Xi Jinping reiterated this ideal in 2014, by calling for a stronger global “Chinese narrative” to reshape international perceptions. China’s soft power campaign has been pursued primarily through large-scale initiatives such as the creation of Confucius Institutes worldwide, and the expansion of Chinese international media networks. China’s growing appeal is further demonstrated by its rise as a top destination for international students, where it ranked third globally. This is also reinforced with China’s establishment of over a thousand Confucius Institutes worldwide. Yet, the effectiveness of these initiatives as genuine soft power instruments remains deeply contested. These mechanisms aim to promote Chinese language, culture, and innovation, while simultaneously strengthening China’s political and economic influence abroad. They also target the Chinese diaspora, with efforts to encourage investment and loyalty to the CCP while countering anti-regime sentiment. While they clearly enhance China’s cultural visibility and educational influence, the pretense of the institutes requires people to be interested in Chinese culture which is not guaranteed in all contexts.
But the most important aspect of China’s soft power is its global investments and the leveraging of their economic power. Critics highlight the dangers of debt dependency, opaque lending practices, and the perception of “debt-trap diplomacy.” These concerns arise from the fact that China’s influence is often transactional rather than attractive, undermining the nature of soft power. Furthermore, China’s global image remains largely negative despite massive investment in cultural diplomacy. A survey by the Pew Research Centre shows that international attitudes toward China have stagnated or slightly improved. However, the recipients of these donations, such as Southeast Asian countries, generally praise the initiative claiming that it has a positive impact. This is reflected in China’s large investment into soft power initiatives, including $50 billion for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, $41 billion for the New Development Bank, $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt, and $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road. It is therefore fair to say that China’s investment is yielding some returns, however, on a global scale, such positive attitudes may be harder to replicate. In short, while China has successfully built the infrastructure of soft power and demonstrated its ability to project it in parts of the world such as Southeast Asia, it still struggles to generate the credibility and attraction that sustain it. Its authoritarian governance model undercuts its attempts to present itself as a benevolent global partner. Consequently, Beijing has increasingly turned to 'sharp power,' relying on pervasive censorship and the manipulation of democratic and civic institutions. Thus, although China has expanded its international influence through wealth and connectivity, it remains more a practitioner of “sharp power” which is the strategic manipulation of information, economy, and culture rather than a genuine master of soft power.
Since the Cold War, Russia has consistently positioned itself as the principal adversary of the Western hegemony. During that period, Russia competed with the United States through proxy wars in Afghanistan and through ideological, cultural, and technological rivalries. However, in the post-Soviet era, Russia’s approach to global influence has shifted toward more overt and confrontational tactics, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These acts of aggression have significantly damaged Russia’s international standing, turning it into a geopolitical pariah on the world stage. As a result, Moscow has increasingly sought to compensate for its isolation through alternative forms of influence. Namely, through the use of soft power and, more accurately, “sharp power.” Russia’s version of soft power, however, is often deployed through manipulative or coercive means that distort, rather than attract global opinion. The use of “troll farms,” disinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks describe Russia’s use of sharp power. These activities often involve coordinated online propaganda designed to sow discord and undermine public trust in Western democratic systems. These strategies are effective at destabilizing adversaries such as the United States. However, they are ineffective in enhancing Russia’s positive appeal or cultural legitimacy, instead reinforcing global perceptions of Russia as a malevolent actor. This inevitably erodes the credibility of Russia, which is the foundation of soft power. Moscow’s objectives are to weaken transatlantic unity between the European Union and the USA and present itself as the ideological antithesis to liberal democracy.
In pursuit of this, Russia promotes conservative, traditionalist, and anti-liberal values as an alternative to what it portrays as Western moral decay. The most notable example is the Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s display of ultra conservatism to combat what he describes as “(some countries) deliberately destroy(ing) norms of morality, institutions of the family, push whole peoples towards extinction and degeneration”. Thus, Putin is able to portray the West as “satanic” in order to garner support for the war in Ukraine and push the anti-West rhetoric within Russia. This model can attract certain audiences, particularly illiberal regimes and populist movements by providing an ideological refuge from Western dominance. This benefits the regime as it allows those disillusioned with the Western influence to create partnerships. Despite Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and authoritarian system, which should theoretically constrain its ability to convey soft power, it continues to influence anti-Western states and Sub-Saharan African nations. This is largely due to the perceived double standards of the actions of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. As such, Russia holds a genuine attractiveness as an opposition to Western dominance. Despite being a regime that suppresses dissent, manipulates information, and relies on coercion, Russia has managed to somewhat create an opposition Western hegemony. Thus, Russia weaponizes culture and information to pursue geopolitical ends, demonstrating that dictatorships can use soft power to an extent.
Corruption is endemic in both China and Russia, and their exploitative practices frequently extend beyond their own borders. This dynamic is particularly apparent in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has become a battlefield for foreign investors, contractors, and even mercenaries seeking to profit from the region’s natural resources. However, both China and Russia often undermine their soft power potential through practices associated with state capture, whereby powerful states cultivate such extensive influence over weaker governments that domestic leaders act primarily in the interests of the foreign patron. Russia has been accused by Western countries of brokering questionable deals with African leaders by using military support or political backing that has destabilized the continent. Moscow frames these activities as part of a moral crusade to counter Western neo-imperialism, yet the methods employed such as covert contracts and elite co-optation suggest a form of influence rooted in coercion and dependency rather than genuine attraction. Further, the involvement of the Wagner group and private military contractors in parts of Africa has eroded Russia’s reliability as an ally of the African people. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has facilitated vast infrastructure projects across Africa, building roads, railways, and ports that ostensibly promote development. Yet critics argue that the BRI often creates debt dependency and fosters corruption, as Chinese loans are frequently tied to political loyalty rather than transparent economic assessment. Such practices raise fundamental questions about the credibility and sustainability of authoritarian soft power. While both states have successfully cultivated influence through economic leverage and elite networks, these relationships are typically pragmatic rather than ideological. Consequently, they lack the moral authority and cultural resonance that underpin enduring soft power. Furthermore, Western complicity in similar exploitative systems of patronage and corruption allows China and Russia to position themselves as anti-Western alternatives, without needing to embody a more ethical or attractive model of governance.
In summation, China and Russia have both made significant attempts to reinvent their image despite their authoritarian regimes’ actions. Their efforts to align themselves with the Global South such as Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to gain allies in the international community, has been somewhat effective. But these efforts are ultimately hindered by both the authoritarian regimes’ actions in their domestic politics that have made it difficult to conceal their true intentions. Further, it is clear through the observations made in this essay that China, due to its significant economic power, is much more effective in exercising soft power when compared to Russia. That said, both nations prove more effective in exercising sharp power than soft power by virtue of their political structure and reliance on coercive partnerships.
Layla is currently a 4th year student studying a Bachelor's degree in Commerce and Bachelor's degree in international relations. She has a strong interest in South East Asian politics and economic development.
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