Soft Power and Australian Security in the Realist World

Rupert Azzopardi

Source: Media from the Lowly Institute

Introduction: A Quiet Force in the Pacific 

Soft power, which can shape agendas and encourage cooperation for mutual benefit, has long been a cornerstone of Australia’s foreign policy toward its Pacific neighbours. Through aid, cultural and sporting ties, and education, Australia has cultivated a favourable image as a key partner in developing South Pacific nations. Initiatives such as the Rugby League Pacific Championships position Australia as a regional leader, with its norms of unity and shared interests resonating amongst Pacific island states.

As a result, Australia has avoided a realist, defence-driven relationship with its neighbours. Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper promoted the aim of “integrating [ing] Pacific countries into the Australian and New Zealand economies and our security institutions.” Collaborative efforts tackling regional issues are thus strong ways for Australia to demonstrate its leadership: for example, Australia is a valued member of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and contributes funding and tangible assistance to troubles facing members.

The capability to influence other states with soft power is compromised by the overtures of more powerful actors, namely, China. On the eve of Albanese’s election, the Solomon Islands, one of Australia’s closest neighbours, announced a security agreement with China. Instead of noticeable militarisation in response to this presumed threat, Albanese has rapidly sought bilateral arrangements with various Pacific states. Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu have been attracted to security agreements with Australia in exchange for non-traditional guarantees and atypical support measures, mostly tailored to the state’s needs.

Navigating Geopolitical Challenges

Australia has instantly attempted to ingratiate itself with the new Trump administration, which wants its allies to reach a defence expenditure of 5% of their GDPs. Australia’s defence expenditure is only 2% of its GDP. The Treasury expects to reach 2.3% by 2034, but this hardly constitutes a pass mark. Considering the amount Australia is paying in advance for Virginia-class submarines — that Australia might not get, according to former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull — Australia should be hoping that Trump and defence secretary Pete Hegseth recognise their other commitments to security in the region as an asset. 

Australia has actively pursued security partnerships with Pacific nations to reinforce regional stability in response to the Solomon Islands’ 2022 ‘Framework Agreement’ with China. Analysts have described this monumental deal as having “open[ed] the door” for further Chinese influence in Australia’s neighbourhood. 

There is certainly truth to this analysis. In 2024, one of the few remaining states recognising Taiwan over the People’s Republic of China — Nauru — switched allegiance to the mainland. When Bendigo Bank withdrew from the island, risking Nauru becoming “unbanked”, it sought to attract support from outside a Taiwan-allied axis, reflecting the trend that states have increasingly looked to China over Taiwan for economic support.

However, the Albanese government has not risked complacency so far. The Nauru-Australian Treaty was enacted less than a year after Nauru switched allegiance to the PRC. Furthermore, Australia pledged $190 million to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force in December 2024, effectively limiting the growth of China’s policing presence. Finally, despite Vanuatu’s unclear political affiliations (complicated by six prime ministers in five years), Albanese managed a bilateral security agreement with the state in 2022.

It remains to be seen whether the US, under its new administration, will perceive Australia’s commitment to regional security as warranting reciprocal support. With Australia’s steel and aluminium industry already hit with American tariffs, their attempts to highlight a longstanding partnership seem to have fallen at the first hurdle. If Australia wishes to maintain US support, it must prove its capability to manage the South Pacific as an, if not allied, then neutral venue.

Sport and Soft Power Among Pacific Nations

In lieu of an unsustainable increase in the defence budget, Australia can offer up its soft power engagements with Pacific actors in its neighbourhood to ensure its own and the United States’ national interests. Australia is the only country with diplomatic posts in all Pacific island states, which gives it a distinct advantage in dialogue over other actors. Furthermore, Australia takes precedence in discussions with Pacific actors due to its status as a full member of the Pacific Islands Forum. China, the United States, and the EU do not have the same social infrastructure in the Pacific as Australia.

Sport is a significant aspect of Australia's advanced regional relationships with the South Pacific. Australia has found itself having to wrest back influence from China, and sport — recognised in the Department of Foreign Affairs as ‘the Strategy’ — is a common cultural medium in many Pacific states. Brannigan et al. identify how hosting sporting events may be used to gain or restore regional hegemony. Qatar hosted the 2022 FIFA World Cup to “emerge from the foreign policy and diplomatic shadow of” Saudi Arabia; meanwhile, Tokyo’s 2020 Olympic Games had a manifold effect on Japanese foreign policy, showcasing its cultural influence, political openness and regional strength amidst rivals South Korea and China. 

Australia prefers to engage with its neighbours more systematically, hosting smaller-scale tournaments to ensure its regional standing. Last year, it hosted the Pacific Rugby League Tournament, where Tonga faced the Kangaroos in the final in Western Sydney. In 2026, Australia will host the Women’s Asian Cup in football. In February, Canberra staged the Young Matildas Four Nations tournament that included the women’s teams of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and Thailand. Norms of inclusivity and gender equality are implicit when hosting (and partaking in) multinational tournaments such as these. In such events, Australia disperses its influence by acting as a norm entrepreneur and patron for events that implicate greater regional cohesion.

Furthermore, Australia leverages its position as a sporting-cultural pioneer with investment, directly countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative investments. For example, China has invested directly in the Solomon Islands’ $53 million National Stadium in time for the 2023 Pacific Games. However, more direct cultural ties grant Australia a regional advantage regarding investment as influence. The Albanese government’s $600 million investment in a new National Rugby League (NRL) team in Port Moresby won over the NRL and Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape. Paid in instalments over ten years, the annual cost amounts to approximately 0.1% of Australia’s defence budget: a very small premium to pay for the reported condition that Papua New Guinea cannot strike security arrangements with China. As Rochelle Stewart-Withers, a Professor in Indigenous and International Development at Massey University, identifies, rugby is a consistent mode of dialogue between Australia and Papua New Guinea, with the annual Prime Minister’s XIII game “an opportunity to deliver key messages.” A more tailored approach to investment gives Australia an advantage in the South Pacific.

Other bilateral arrangements with Pacific nations are thinly veiled attempts at instituting a local security sphere through its soft-power statecraft. New deals under Albanese’s terms with Tuvalu and Nauru have effectively barred these states from entering a security agreement with China. In exchange, Australia offers these states soft power concessions. The Falepili Union with Tuvalu would repatriate every Tuvaluan in the case of climate disaster. The Nauru-Australian Treaty guarantees Commonwealth Bank activity on the island, ensuring Nauru more financial security. Australia has secured vital alliances by addressing the pressing needs of vulnerable neighbours.

As a result, many Pacific Islands can consider Australia the security ‘partner of choice.’ Without a single cent of extra defence expenditure, Australia has consolidated a loyal security sphere in the Pacific to challenge China’s growing influence. These efforts, while not specifically within the realms of the defence budget, should be factored into an American appraisal of Australia’s regional contributions.

Conclusion

In response to the presence of China in Australia’s Pacific neighbourhood, Australia has sought to consolidate longstanding alliances on normative and cultural grounds while incentivising a security allegiance amongst these states. Soft power, a characteristic vessel for Chinese influence, has been enthusiastically adopted by Australia in Albanese’s tenure as prime minister.

However, the legislative foundation of these incentives and leadership efforts has reinforced Australia’s regional strategic dominance. Australia has secured a network of stable and cooperative neighbours by engaging with individual states through tailored bilateral agreements. Its hands-on approach to the Pacific Islands Forum has meant that it has an advantage over other interested parties in the Pacific and can make suggestions, propose solutions, and directly offer funding for collaborative regional projects.

If the US expects Australia to increase its military engagement to counterbalance China, such a demand may be unrealistic and strategically imprudent. Despite the Trump administration’s zero-sum approach to military investment amongst allies, Australia’s efforts to securitise the region, instead of a notable increase in defence expenditure, should earn its plaudits. Since 2022, Australia has limited the proliferation of Chinese political influence in the region more effectively than any other actor. A combination of soft power and shrewd incentives have done more to protect combined US and Australian interests than any defence budget increase could.

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Rupert is a Master of International Relations student at the University of Melbourne, where he also completed a Bachelor of Arts. Conducting a minor thesis as part of his master's, he is currently researching the causality of Indonesian presidents’ responses to the South China Sea dispute with China. He has a strong interest in the ways in which middle powers can shape regional dialogue and promote peaceful interactivity.